



U.S. Department of Justice

Immigration and Naturalization Service

OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS
425 Eye Street N.W.
ULLB, 3rd Floor
Washington, D.C. 20536

File: EAC-97-135-50293

Office: Vermont Service Center

Date: JUN 12 2000

IN RE: Petitioner:
Beneficiary:

Petition: Petition for Special Immigrant Religious Worker Pursuant to Section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4)

IN BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

denying data deleted to
prevent clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy

Public Copy

INSTRUCTIONS:

This is the decision in your case. All documents have been returned to the office which originally decided your case. Any further inquiry must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied or the analysis used in reaching the decision was inconsistent with the information provided or with precedent decisions, you may file a motion to reconsider. Such a motion must state the reasons for reconsideration and be supported by any pertinent precedent decisions. Any motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider, as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.5(a)(1)(i).

If you have new or additional information which you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reopen. Such a motion must state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and be supported by affidavits or other documentary evidence. Any motion to reopen must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reopen, except that failure to file before this period expires may be excused in the discretion of the Service where it is demonstrated that the delay was reasonable and beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner. Id.

Any motion must be filed with the office which originally decided your case along with a fee of \$110 as required under 8 C.F.R. 103.7.

FOR THE ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER,
EXAMINATIONS

[Signature]

Terrence M. O'Reilly, Director
Administrative Appeals Office

JUN 2000 - 0112203

DISCUSSION: The immigrant visa petition was denied by the Director, Vermont Service Center. The Associate Commissioner for Examinations dismissed an appeal from the decision. The matter is again before the Associate Commissioner on motion to reopen. The prior decision dismissing the appeal will be affirmed.

The petitioner is a church that seeks classification of the beneficiary as a special immigrant religious worker pursuant to section 203(b)(4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4), in order to employ her as a religious youth counselor.

Section 203(b)(4) of the Act provides classification to qualified special immigrant religious workers as described in section 101(a)(27)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(C), which pertains to an immigrant who:

- (i) for at least 2 years immediately preceding the time of application for admission, has been a member of a religious denomination having a bona fide nonprofit, religious organization in the United States;

- (ii) seeks to enter the United States--

- (I) solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of a minister of that religious denomination,

- (II) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization at the request of the organization in a professional capacity in a religious vocation or occupation, or

- (III) before October 1, 2000, in order to work for the organization (or for a bona fide organization which is affiliated with the religious denomination and is exempt from taxation as an organization described in section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Code of 1986) at the request of the organization in a religious vocation or occupation; and

- (iii) has been carrying on such vocation, professional work, or other work continuously for at least the 2-year period described in clause (i).

The director denied the petition finding that the petitioner had failed to establish the beneficiary's two years of continuous religious work experience. The director also found that the petitioner had failed to establish that the prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

The Associate Commissioner, through the Director of the Administrative Appeals Office ("AAO"), held on appeal that the petitioner had not established the beneficiary's two years of continuous religious work experience. The AAO further found that the petitioner had failed to establish that the prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

On motion to reopen, counsel stated that the petitioner was submitting "new and previously unavailable evidence of material facts."

The first issue to be examined is whether the petitioner has established that the beneficiary had two years of continuous work experience in the proffered position.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(1) states, in pertinent part, that:

All three types of religious workers must have been performing the vocation, professional work, or other work continuously (either abroad or in the United States) for at least the two year period immediately preceding the filing of the petition.

The petition was filed on April 14, 1997. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that the beneficiary had been continuously working in the prospective occupation for at least the two years from April 14, 1995 to April 14, 1997.

In its letter dated April 2, 1997, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary "acted as a full-time Religious Youth Counselor since January 1994 on a voluntary basis." On motion, counsel stated that "the fact that the beneficiary has to date performed all of her teaching duties without monetary compensation is not unreasonable."

Neither the statute nor the regulations stipulate an explicit requirement that the work experience must have been full-time paid employment in order to be considered qualifying. This is in recognition of the special circumstances of some religious workers, specifically those engaged in a religious vocation, in that they may not be salaried in the conventional sense and may not follow a conventional work schedule. 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) defines a religious vocation, in part, as a calling to religious life evidenced by the taking of vows. The regulations therefore recognize a distinction between someone practicing a life-long religious calling and a lay employee. The regulation defines religious occupations, in contrast, in general terms as an activity related to a traditional religious function. *Id.* In order to qualify for special immigrant classification in a religious occupation, the job offer for a lay employee of a religious

organization must show that he or she will be employed in the conventional sense of full-time salaried employment. See 8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(4). Therefore, the prior work experience must have been full-time salaried employment in order to qualify as well. The absence of specific statutory language requiring that the two years of work experience be conventional full-time paid employment does not imply, in the case of religious occupations, that any form of intermittent, part-time, or volunteer activity constitutes continuous work experience in such an occupation.

The petitioner has not established that the beneficiary was continuously engaged in a religious occupation from April 14, 1995 to April 14, 1997. The objection of the director has not been overcome on appeal. Accordingly, the petition may not be approved.

The next issue to be examined is whether the prospective occupation is a religious occupation.

8 C.F.R. 204.5(m)(2) states, in pertinent part, that:

Religious occupation means an activity which relates to a traditional religious function. Examples of individuals in religious occupations include, but are not limited to, liturgical workers, religious instructors, religious counselors, cantors, catechists, workers in religious hospitals or religious health care facilities, missionaries, religious translators, or religious broadcasters. This group does not include janitors, maintenance workers, clerks, fund raisers, or persons solely involved in the solicitation of donations.

The regulation does not define the term "traditional religious function" and instead provides only a brief list of examples. The examples listed reflect that not all employees of a religious organization are considered to be engaged in a religious occupation. The regulation states that positions such as cantor, missionary, or religious instructor are examples of qualifying religious occupations. Persons in such positions must complete prescribed courses of training established by the governing body of the denomination and their services are directly related to the creed of the denomination. The regulation reflects that nonqualifying positions are those whose duties are primarily administrative, humanitarian, or secular. Persons in such positions must be qualified in their occupation, but they require no specific religious training or theological education.

The Service therefore interprets the term "traditional religious function" to require a demonstration that the duties of the position are directly related to the religious creed of the denomination, that specific prescribed religious training or

theological education is required, that the position is defined and recognized by the governing body of the denomination, and that the position is traditionally a permanent, full-time, salaried occupation within the denomination.

In its letter dated April 2, 1997, the petitioner stated that the beneficiary's "responsibilities require religious training and experience beyond that of a dedicated congregation member." The AAO found that the beneficiary's prospective occupation is not a religious occupation. On motion, counsel submitted:

[A] Position Paper of The General Council of the Assemblies of God (USA) on the Theology of Ministry that teaching of the Bible by laypersons is a traditional religious function within the Assemblies of God faith;

Various articles published in the Christian Education Counselor related to the teaching of Sunday School and what is entailed in teaching the Bible to children and teens.

Counsel argued that these documents "confirm that the proposed duties of the beneficiary . . . are traditional and common duties engaged in by other Christian Educators." Counsel's argument is not persuasive. The position paper stated that "teaching is . . . a spiritual gift." The "various articles" provide guidelines for teaching Sunday school to teenagers. None of the additional documentation submitted by counsel on motion overcomes the Associate Commissioner's finding that the prospective occupation is not a religious occupation.

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1361. Here, the petitioner has not sustained that burden.

ORDER: The decision dated February 2, 1999, is affirmed. The petition is denied.